What are the takeaways from the Supreme Court’s Decision in the HOR Case?
- “That this Court’s interpretation of Article 33 of the Constitution (1986), is that whether a simple majority is sitting or a lower number, in both cases a Presiding Officer, defined in Article 49 of the Constitution is the Speaker, and in his/her absence, the Deputy Speaker”
Takeaway: The Supreme Court interpreted Articles 33 and 49 of the Constitution as written: that the Speaker is the Presiding Officer (Article 49); and as Presiding Officer, the Speaker presides over Plenary Sittings or Sessions of the HOR; whether it is a simple majority that is sitting (a quorum), which can hold sessions, or less (a lower number), which cannot hold sessions (Article 33), the sittngs or sessions must be presided over by the Speaker, the Presiding Officer. That the Deputy Speaker presides in the absence of the Speaker; that is, when the Speaker is not at work, or if he asked the Deputy Speaker to preside, or if he recuses himself from presiding.
- “That in the event where the Speaker is presiding over a minority [as in this case], the Court is devoid of the mechanism for how the minority is to compel attendance of absent members….”
Takeaway: The Court acknowledges here that it is without authority to delve into the merits of this issue because it has no constitutional authority to do so. And as the Court said, and rightly so, the Constitution does not provide for how absent members should be compelled to attend Plenary Sessions. Therefore, it remains a political question until the constitution is amended or the Legislature enacts a law or a rule providing for how this can be done. (Read my previous post on the political question doctrine). Until then, members of the HOR must voluntarily fulfill their constitutional obligation by attending regular sessions presided over by the Speaker.
- “WHEREFORE AND IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, any sittings or actions by members of the Legislature not in conformity with the intent of Articles 33 and 49 of the Constitution are ultra vires. Hence, members of the House of Representatives are to conduct themselves accordingly.”
Takeaway: The Speaker’s case was for the Supreme Court to look into the constitutionality of some actions taken by the “majority bloc,” that is, holding sessions, suspending members, restructuring committees, taking possession of the budget, and electing a Speaker.
So, the Court summed up everything here (after first recognizing that the Speaker is the Presideing Officer): that “any sittings and actions by the Legislature” (the “majority bloc”) inconsistent with Articles 33 and 49 of the Constitution are beyond or outside of their constitutional powers (ultra vires). And if, by parity of reasoning, the sittings and actions by the “majority bloc” (without the Speaker, who is the Presiding Officer, presiding) are “ultra vires,” then it follows that everything done by them (holding sessions, suspending members, restructuring committees, taking possession of the budget, and electing a Speaker) is illegal. In other words, that they had no authority or not within their powers to do so.
